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FROM THE SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

WASHINGTON, D. C.--Tricks of the spy trade, as practiced by Col. Stig Eric Constans Wennerstroem, the ubiquitous Soviet spy who roamed the United States for five years as a Swedish air attache, are disclosed in a publication prepared for use of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and released today by Senator James O. Eastland, (D-Miss.) Chairman.

The publication, titled "The Wennerstroem Spy Case," gives detailed excerpts from Col. Wennerstroem's interrogation by the Swedish Federal Police Agency in Stockholm and elsewhere. During his questioning, he confessed and, on June 12, 1964, he was convicted of gross espionage and sentenced to life imprisonment. The 57-year-old retired colonel in the Swedish Air Force was, by his own testimony, a Soviet spy from 1948 until his arrest June 20, 1963. He served in Washington as Sweden's air attache from April 1952 to May 1957.

Two of his basic tenets as a spy were (1) cultivate the wives and (2) cultivate the big shots.

"If it is desired to have closer contacts in the United States, it is necessary, in most cases, to include the women," he said. "Women have a much greater influence over the men than we realize. If a closer contact with somebody is desired and if the spouse of the party concerned could be interested in the meeting, she would be a driving factor to a great extent."

When he visited a military installation or an industrial plant, Wennerstroem said he first "fostered relations with the highest chiefs so that I became known among them. When I subsequently met officials of lower rank, particularly in the case of the military, I referred

to these higher chiefs and the result was...that they expressed themselves in a positive way and said to the lower official concerned that he should help me in my mission as much as he could...Such a little example makes a tremendous impression, in any case in America, on a subordinate official."

Wennerstroem's main assignment from the Soviet was to gather material on technical developments in the United States, which was to a certain extent similar to his duties as Swedish air attache.

He noted, however, that "my Swedish intelligence service was of a general nature whereas my assignments for the Soviet intelligence were specialized."

"It was explained to me," Wennerstroem told the interrogators, "that the main job was to send descriptions of equipment of exclusively modern design, with all details, drawings, diagrams, and similar illustrations to be of value to the Russian designers. The purpose was to obtain new ideas and improve conventional designs in the Soviet Union; the final objective was to save time in the process of development."

During his first year in Washington, Wennerstroem not only fulfilled his main assignment, but sent in data concerning strategic planning, position and use of bombers, NATO strategy, and other operational material.

However, he was soon advised not to provide material of that kind unless he had a specific inquiry.

"The (Soviet) general was quite frank when he stated that there was no sense to continue this reporting because they had contacts

in this field which were better than myself," Wennerstroem explained.

For Col. Wennerstroem, the Soviet assignments were relatively simple. Most of the material wanted was not restricted and was readily obtainable to him in his position as Swedish air attache. Some literature was requested in writing from the Pentagon, and other data was collected in trips to various installations in the United States and Canada.

At defense industries, he would indicate that Sweden was interested in purchasing a certain product. He would therefore experience little difficulty in getting detailed plans. He was rarely asked if he was authorized to see secret material, but when he was, he answered in the affirmative.

"They did not ask for any verification and, in general, this was based on the fact that I had been introduced from the top by the highest chief," he said.

Once the literature was obtained, Wannerstroem would put it on microfilm and slip it to Soviet contacts in a number of different ways. Often the microfilm would be transferred during a handshake at diplomatic receptions, but there were many other meeting places, indoors and outdoors.

Wennerstroem said he received approximately \$750 a month from the Soviet Union during his five-year stay in Washington. Much of that was used for expenses in his untiring travels collecting technical data. He testified that he was free to draw out much larger sums, but he decided to do it at "a later, more suitable date." When he was apprehended in Stockholm, he said "these plans had taken a more concrete form."

The Soviet spy was asked on one occasion to check a report from Moscow that "an action was being prepared on the American side against the Soviet Union in the nature of a surprising action."

"I expected that if something takes place which is of such great importance...there would be hectic activity in the Pentagon. At that time I had a great number of contacts in the Pentagon whom I knew very well... I made this round and found that there was no difficulty to get in to talk to them... Thus the overall impression was such that it was impossible that anything was underway since nobody was in a particular rush... I reported that, according to my judgment, the reports were definitely wrong," Wennerstroem testified.

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